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1. INTRODUCTION 
Exchange rate policies and regimes have been among the most contested and controversial 
issues in Central and Eastern Europe since the very beginning of transition twelve years ago. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of inflation developments in Central 
and Eastern European accession countries for exchange rate policies and regimes.  
Accession countries are in a process of completing transition and, at the same time, 
preparing for EU accession. Their economies have embarked or are about to embark on a 
catching-up process to the income levels of Western European countries. These processes 
have a distinct bearing on price dynamics in accession countries. Understanding these price 
and price level developments is key to designing and implementing appropriate exchange rate 
policies and adopt proper exchange rate regimes. 
This paper consists of three main parts. Section 2 comprises some basic facts about 
exchange rate regimes, inflation developments and price level convergence during the course 
of the transition process so far. Section 3 deals with selected driving forces of price dynamics; 
it takes a forward-looking perspective. Building on this background, section 4 explores policy 
implications in general and for monetary policy in particular.  
2. SOME BASIC FACTS 
2.1. Exchange Rate Regimes of Accession Countries: Recent Changes 
It would go far beyond the objective and the scope of this paper to revisit and reproduce the 
debate on fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes. In order to set the stage for the 
analysis, it is sufficient to recall that, basically, the choice of the exchange rate regime is 
dependent on the size and the degree of openness of an economy, the nature and source of 
shocks it is exposed to, its structural features, the preferences of policymakers, and 
furthermore also on credibility-related considerations.   
The financial crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil between 1997 and 1999 had a marked 
impact on the debate on exchange rate regimes: There has been growing support for the view 
that, in a world of integrated capital markets and greatly increased capital mobility, 
intermediate exchange rate regimes – standard-type pegged regimes and heavily managed 
floats based on unstated exchange rate rules – are inherently unstable, mainly due to the size 
and volatility of capital flows. In this perspective, the future belongs exclusively or almost 
exclusively to corner solutions, i.e. to free (or only very lightly managed) floats and to super-
strict regimes (currency boards, the adoption of a foreign currency as sole or parallel legal 
tender or joining a monetary union).  
A different view concedes that the substantial increase in capital mobility over the last 
decade has clearly made the management of intermediate regimes much more challenging. 
However, it holds that there are still good reasons for many countries to adopt intermediate 
regimes. If the overall macroeconomic policy stance is coherent and the financial system is 
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robust, functions well and is properly supervised, such regimes can be reasonably viable, in 
particular if they are adopted in the context of a broader economic and political integration 
process. Capital account liberalization, if carefully timed and sequenced, can support 
intermediate exchange rate regimes during the transitional period in which these conditions 
are put in place. Corner solutions, in turn, will tend to constitute the exception rather than the 
rule for most countries: Currency boards require very demanding preconditions in order to be 
lastingly viable, while free or only lightly managed floats tend to have significant drawbacks, 
in particular for the development of the real sectors in small open economies.  
Table 1 displays recent exchange rate regime developments, comparing the arrangements 
of the applicants at the start of the Asian crisis in mid-May 1997 with the regimes that are 
currently in place. It shows that exchange rate regimes in Central and Eastern Europe have 
varied widely across countries: One can find all kinds of arrangements, from currency boards 
to lightly managed floats.  
There is no uniform trend which would characterize the evolution of exchange rate regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe over the review period of the past four years. Some countries, 
like Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, have moved or continued to move towards 
greater exchange rate flexibility – either, as Poland and Hungary, within the framework of a 
deliberate strategy  or as a consequence of a successful attack on "standard" exchange rate 
pegs, fixed pegs to be more precise (Czech Republic, Slovakia2). Among the two former 
countries, Poland proceeded to more exchange rate flexibility in several small steps while 
Hungary took one major leap very recently, after having clinged to a regime with limited 
flexibility for six years.  
This move towards more exchange rate flexibility has been combined with or followed by 
the adoption of direct inflation targeting frameworks (Czech Republic and Poland), or by a 
more eclectic strategy that has brought together elements of monetary and direct inflation 
targeting, while gradually strengthening the latter (Slovakia). Hungary moved to an "implicit" 
inflation targeting shortly after adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime.   
Other countries have not advanced towards greater exchange rate flexibility. Latvia has 
retained a standard-type fixed peg with narrow bands. The number of currency board 
countries has increased from two to three, with Bulgaria joining Estonia and Lithuania. Also, 
it should be noted that the two countries that operate crawling peg regimes (Poland and 
Hungary) have greatly reduced their crawl rates, especially more recently. 
In terms of corner solutions versus intermediate exchange rate regimes, the following 
picture emerges: Two countries have typical intermediate regimes, Latvia and Slovenia 
(which operates a tightly managed float). Hungary can also be counted into this group, 
despite its new wide fluctuation band. The number of clear intermediate regimes has thus 
gone down over the past four years. Three countries, namely the currency board countries, 
have definite corner solutions. The degree of exchange rate management in the other four 
countries has been diverse, with little central bank intervention in the foreign exchange 
market in the Czech Republic and Poland since early 1998. However, even in these two cases, 
                                                 
2 In terms of timing, these two regime collapses are closely linked, in terms of timing, to emerging market crises 
events (for a short analysis, see Backé 1999). 
ICEG EC Working Paper Peter Backé: Inflation Developments 
 
6 
the authorities appear to have remained genuinely concerned about exchange rate 
developments. 
Table 1  
Exchange Rate Regimes of Central and Eastern European Accession Countries at the 
Outbreak of the Asian Crisis and Today 
 mid-May 1997  mid-June 2001 
Bulgaria Managed float EUR peg under a currency board  
Czech 
Republic 
Fixed peg to a DEM-USD basket 
Fluctuation band: ±7.5% 
Managed float  
 
Estonia DEM peg under a currency board  DEM/EUR peg under a currency board 
Hungary Crawling peg  
versus DEM-USD basket  
Fluctuation band: ±2.25% 
Automatic monthly devaluation: 1.1% 
Crawling peg  
versus EUR 
Fluctuation band: ±15% 
Automatic monthly devaluation: 0.2% 
Latvia SDR peg  
Fluctuation band: ±1% 
SDR peg 
Fluctuation band: ±1% 
Lithuania USD peg under a currency board USD peg under a currency board 
Poland Crawling peg  
versus a five-currency basket 
Fluctuation band: ±7% 
Automatic monthly devaluation: 1% 
Managed float 
Romania Managed float Managed float 
Slovakia Fixed peg to a DEM-USD basket  
Fluctuation band: ±7% 
Managed float 
Slovenia Managed float Managed float 
 
During the course of the last four years, four of the ten countries – Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia – have carried out exchange rate regime changes. Hungary, in 
turn, has a made tangible alteration within a particular (crawling peg) regime. The other five 
countries, in turn, have undertaken no change or only technical adaptations.  
2.2. Inflation Developments during Transition: Stylized Facts  
Price developments since the beginning of the transition can be divided into four phases.  In 
the early stages of transition, Central and Eastern European countries experienced a corrective 
inflation phase associated with sweeping price and trade liberalization coupled with 
substantial nominal exchange rate depreciation at the beginning of transformation. The size of 
the initial price level jump was diverse among individual countries. This phase was associated 
with substantial initial adjustments of relative prices, in particular in the area of tradables.  
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Table 2  
Consumer Price Inflation in the Central and Eastern European Accession Countries 
(annual average, in %) 
 
 
B
ulgaria 
C
zech 
R
epublic 
Estonia 
H
ungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
R
om
ania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
1990       23.8         9.7        28.9   585.8        5.1       10.4    549.7 
1991 338.5  56.6   35.0 70.3 170.2  61.2    117.7 
1992 91.2  11.1   23.0 243.3 43.0 210.4  10.0  201.3 
1993 72.8  20.8  89.8  22.5 108.8 410.2 35.3 256.1  23.2  32.3 
1994 96.0  10.0  47.7  18.8 35.9 72.2 32.2 136.8  13.4  19.8 
1995 62.1  9.1  28.8  28.2 25.0 39.7 27.8 32.3  9.9  12.6 
1996 123.0  8.8  23.1  23.6 17.6 24.6 19.9 38.8  5.8  9.7 
1997 1,082.3  8.5  10.6  18.3 8.4 8.9 14.9 154.8  6.1  9.1 
1998 22.3  10.7  8.2  14.3 4.6 5.1 11.8 59.1  6.7  8.6 
1999 0.3  2.1  3.3  10.0 2.4 0.8 7.3 45.8  10.6  6.6 
2000 9.9  4.1  4.0  9.8 1.8 1.0 10.1 45.7  12.2  8.9 
Source: WIIW (collected from national sources).  
Remark: Eurostat has recently published a harmonized CPI for the accession countries since 1996 (see 
http://europa.eu.int/newcronos/exec/extract/de/theme2/price/ihicp_cc/hmind_cc.htm). 
 
The harmonized figures are, in most cases, close or very close to the figures presented 
above. 
As stabilization took hold in most accession countries, annual inflation was substantially 
reduced to moderate rates (high-single or low-double digits).3 These inflation rates then 
proved to be fairly persistent in a number of transition economies. In this phase, relative price 
adjustments became less turbulent and began to exhibit a typical pattern in which 
nontradables prices increased faster than tradables prices. 
Further headway towards disinflation, though to a different extent, was made after the 
onset of the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998. This is attributed to a combination of negative 
demand shocks (lower import demand from Russia and the European Union) and positive 
supply shocks (very low oil prices which actually started to fall already in the wake of the 
Asian crisis; constant or falling food prices, as food exports to Russia were redirected to the 
domestic markets). The Czech Republic and the Baltic countries advanced to fairly low rates 
of inflation in this period and have retained this edge subsequently. 
                                                 
3 Stabilization policies were much less successful in Bulgaria (until 1997) and in Romania.  
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The last and most recent phase began in the spring and summer of 1999, when disinflation 
came to a halt in most, if not all accession countries. Subsequently, a number of applicant 
countries registered a more or less pronounced pick-up of inflation. These less favorable 
developments are ascribed to a combination of positive demand shocks (increasing growth 
dynamics mainly due to additional import demand from the European Union until the second 
quarter of 2000 and higher import demand from Russia) and probably far more important 
negative supply shocks (rising import prices due to the surging oil price and to euro/U.S. 
dollar developments in conjunction with the euro-linked or euro-oriented exchange rate 
policies of various accession countries; growing food prices mainly due to bad harvests).  
While this general pattern of developments applies to most accession countries, the 
disinflation process in each individual applicant country displays country-specific 
peculiarities as well. Typically, temporary bouts in inflation reflect the short-term impact of 
stabilization packages (e.g. Hungary 1995, Slovakia 1999) or major reforms in the indirect 
tax system (e.g. the introduction of VAT in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 or in 
Slovenia in 1999), while disinflation dynamics have been enhanced by recession (Czech 
Republic 1998/99).4 
A caveat has to be added here. Inflation data, in particular consumer price inflation data, 
may be upward-biased. Some argue that there is a bias and that this bias is substantial in the 
case of Central and Eastern European countries (see e.g. Skreb, 1998, who points out the 
dramatic increase in the number of new products and the improving quality of existing 
products in transition economies).  
2.3. Price Level Convergence 
To put inflation developments into perspective and to relate them more closely to the 
accession process, it is useful to shed some light on the degree of price level convergence that 
has been achieved so far.  
A convenient way to approach this issue is to look at the development of the comparative 
price levels which relate (market) exchange rates to purchasing power parities.5 A 
comparative price level of 100% means that, at the given (market) exchange rate, price levels 
are the same in the country under examination and in the reference country. Figures below 
100% indicate that the price level in the country under examination is lower than the price 
level in the reference country. More specifically, they imply that the (market) exchange rate 
assigns a lower value (in currency units of the reference country) to one local currency unit 
than the purchasing power parity. Starting from such a position, price level convergence is a 
process of real appreciation of the local currency against the currency of the reference 
country. Table 3 reports the development of comparative price levels relative to Germany 
                                                 
4  In order to review the inflation process in a more substantial manner, it is useful to look at other inflation 
indexes, apart from consumer price inflation, in particular on core inflation measure. For a simple concept of 
core inflation and some analysis on Central and Eastern European accession countries, see Fidrmuc (2000). 
5 The comparative price level is the ratio of the (market) exchange rate to purchasing power parity, both 
denominated in currency units of the reference country per one local currency unit. 
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during the course of the 1990s. It therefore provides information about price level deviations 
of accession countries and selected EU countries from the German level. 
Table 3   
Comparative Price Levels (in % of the German Price Level)  
 1991 1992 1994 1998 1999 
Bulgaria 15.8 16.3 17.9 26.2 27.0 
Czech Republic 21.7 22.3 28.3 36.5 35.7 
Estonia n/a 12.1 31.7 38.8 41.1 
Hungary 34.6 35.5 38.2 38.8 39.3 
Latvia n/a 11.5 35.7 36.6 38.5 
Lithuania n/a 7.5 28.0 35.3 39.8 
Poland  34.9 33.6 34.6 43.9 43.0 
Romania 19.5 13.1 18.6 26.7 23.7 
Slovakia 23.3 24.4 27.6 33.2 31.5 
Slovenia 50.2 47.3 49.0 58.7 59.8 
Austria 96.2 96.2 95.6 96.9 97.5 
Greece 70.1 67.5 63.4 70.4 72.4 
Ireland 85.4 82.2 75.0 89.7 90.9 
Portugal 60.3 64.7 55.8 62.4 63.4 
Spain 84.2 84.7 71.0 76.4 77.4 
Source: WIIW, World Bank, OECD. 
 
Regarding price level convergence to date, three observations are noteworthy: First, 
exchange rates in 1992 were strongly undervalued in relation to purchasing power parities. 
Second, the degree of undervaluation was reduced considerably during the 1990s, but third, 
(with the exception of Slovenia) these undervaluations are still significantly larger than in the 
catching-up economies in the Euro-12 area. 
Price level convergence will go hand in hand with the convergence of the candidates’ 
levels of economic development with the levels prevailing in the European Union. Integration 
of candidate countries into the EU and later into the euro area will give additional impetus to 
price level convergence.  
Within the euro area, there is a strong and significant negative correlation between the level 
of inflation rates and comparative price levels (ECB 1999). Figure 1 appears to suggest that a 
comparable, albeit somewhat weaker relationship holds true for the Central and Eastern  
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European accession countries.6 This figure shows the relation between the comparative price 
levels of 1999 and the inflation rates (1998 and 1999 average) of all candidate countries 
(except for Romania which is an outlier in terms of inflation).   
Figure 1   
Inflation and Comparative price level 
 
3. PRESENT AND FUTURE DRIVING FORCES OF PRICE DYNAMICS 
Inflation in accession countries is driven by a multitude of factors which encompass 
transition-related, accession-related, catching-up-related sources as well as policy-related 
determinants of inflation; furthermore, external factors are also important.  
A standard approach to analyze inflation developments is to use various econometric tools, 
e.g. VAR techniques, to identify the main determinants of a past inflationary process. A 
number of studies of this kind have been written on Central and Eastern European economies 
in recent years.7 Such analyses have undoubted merits. However, an approach of this kind 
                                                 
6  The comparatively low inflation rates recorded by the Baltic countries are partly due to the recession Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania experienced in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. In Slovenia, in turn, inflation 
developments in the second half of 1999 were specifically affected by the introduction of VAT in the middle 
of last year. 
7  Many of these studies have been undertaken by the IMF staff. The IMF homepage contains a useful 
overview (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm). 
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appears to be less (or only partly useful) for the purpose of this paper. This is so because 
inflation sources in accession countries are undergoing dynamic change. In such a context, 
past relationships among variables may be misleading.  
A basic proposition of this paper is that EU accession and integration is an important 
anchor and incentive for sound macroeconomic and structural policies. This will mitigate or 
do away with several factors that currently drive inflation in accession countries, even though 
accession itself may entail some one-off price adjustments. In particular, any potential 
inflationary bias of monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies will be reduced to a large 
extent under the EU economic policy coordination and surveillance framework. In fact, 
already now, applicants are exposed to a string of policy dialogue and surveillance 
instruments.  
In a similar vein, transition will still impact on inflation in accession countries, but only for 
a limited period of time in the most advanced transition economies. Catching-up, in turn, is a 
long-term process which will impact on inflation developments in accession countries for any 
foreseeable future. 
Against this backdrop, three main sources of current and future price dynamics in accession 
countries are singled out and dealt with in more detail in this chapter, namely (1) price 
deregulation and agricultural prices, (2) productivity developments, and (3) potential wage 
drifts. 
3.1. Completing Transition and Acceding to the European Union 
This section is about those sources of inflation that relate to the completion of the transition  
process and the accession of advanced transition economies to the European Union. The two 
main factors that feature in this twin context are explored in more detail, namely price 
deregulation and agricultural price adjustments. 
The liberalization of administered prices or their adjustment to cost-recovery levels has 
reached an advanced stage in most accession countries. However, it is not yet complete. 
Administered prices still have a share of approximately 10% to 25% in the accession 
countries' consumer baskets. Also, the portion of administered prices that already cover costs 
varies among individual countries. Thus, the order of magnitude of "repressed" inflation due 
to price caps appears to vary among individual accession countries.  
In any case, the final steps towards price liberalization and adjustment will still have a 
bearing on the price dynamics in accession countries during the next years. These adjustments 
are very much "transition-related" dynamics, as they emanate from the legacy of central 
planning in Central and Eastern Europe.  
It should be noted that the liberalization of administered prices or their adjustment to cost-
recovery levels should essentially be completed before EU accession. The Copenhagen 
criteria, as interpreted by the European Commission in its Agenda 2000 (July 1997), require 
that "prices... are liberalised" as a precondition for EU accession. Consequently, this issue 
ICEG EC Working Paper Peter Backé: Inflation Developments 
 
12 
should be principally settled when EU accession takes place. Two qualifications have to be 
added here. First, in some specific areas (like e.g. public transportation in urban areas), a case 
can be made for keeping prices below cost-recovery levels. Second, in the area of public 
utilities, capital costs will typically increase over time, as old production and distribution 
facilities, which have already been depreciated (close to) zero in the books of utility 
companies, are being replaced. This process will extend beyond EU accession. 
Furthermore, if prices remain regulated, transparent and effective price-setting formulas 
have to be put in place which ensure that administered prices, once adjusted to cost-recovery 
levels, will be regularly altered in line with ongoing cost changes. The recent surge in energy 
prices has shown that existing formulas do not always live up to these needs and that political 
interference in the price-setting process has remained significant.   
The adjustment of energy prices for households seems to be the most significant task 
outstanding in this area of regulated prices. A recent analysis of energy price developments in 
four Central and Eastern European accession countries yields the following picture:8  
There has been some convergence between energy prices in four selected Central and 
Eastern European accession countries and energy prices in the EU during the period 1992/93 
to 1998/99. The candidate countries under review have largely reached EU energy price 
levels in most (but not all) types of energy. However, energy prices charged on households 
are still low, as compared to those in the European Union, even if they are higher than in the 
EU when measured relative to GDP per capita. Major adjustments are needed to reach the 
levels of EU economies. 
It follows that the expected adjustments of energy prices will mainly affect the consumer 
price index, while the direct influence on the industrial producer price index and, hence, on 
the inflation of tradables will be relatively less important. Thus, price competitiveness should 
not suffer too much from these energy price adjustments. 
However, the upward push on the CPI triggered by the adjustment of energy prices for 
households will be considerable, as energy constitutes a sizeable share – typically in the 
rough order of around 15% – of the accession countries’ consumer baskets. This, in turn, may 
lead to higher wage claims, which may result in indirect upward pressure on tradables prices.  
The overall upward adjustment of energy prices will probably be mitigated by two factors 
in the medium term. First, the currently high prices of most sources of energy may come 
down to more regular levels as a result of a reduction in the USD price and a strengthening of 
the euro vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. Furthermore, the process of restructuring and liberalizing 
energy sectors in Central and Eastern Europe, which is often linked to privatization, may raise 
their productivity. In particular, the level of energy prices for industry may even decrease 
relative to the corresponding level in EU countries. 
The most obvious case of specific "EU accession-related" price dynamics relates to 
agricultural and food prices. The entry into the European Union will, in all likelihood, involve 
                                                 
8  For more details, see Reininger (2000). Due to data availability constraints, the analysis of Reininger (2000) 
had to be restricted to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
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upward pressures on the level of agricultural prices, which are, on the whole, considerably 
lower in the accession countries than in the EU. Agricultural prices are particularly low 
compared to EU prices for livestock products and some selected crop products like sugarbeet 
or apples. However, it should be noted that there is some variation of agricultural price levels 
among accession countries, but also among EU Member States. Among the former, 
agricultural producer price level convergence has progressed farthest in Slovenia, followed by 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.9 
Changes in agricultural prices have an impact on food prices, which constitute a sizeable 
share of accession countries' consumer baskets (typically around 30% or more, as compared 
to 16% in the European Union), while being on average in the order of one third to one half 
of food prices in the European Union. The size and phasing of this potential source of 
inflation will crucially depend on the integration concepts in the agricultural sector. If the 
newly acceding countries are integrated into the common agricultural policy (CAP) and its 
price system upon their accession to the EU, this adjustment will take place faster than if 
there is a phasing-in period with two different price systems for the incumbent Member States 
and the newly acceding countries.  
As in the case of energy prices, the adjustment of food prices as a consequence of EU 
accession and CAP integration holds the risk of second-round inflation effects and a 
weakening of external competitiveness, if it spills over to wage developments.  
Clearly, EU accession will have additional impacts on price formation. On the fiscal side, 
bringing VAT regulation in line with EU requirements may lead to price rises for certain 
categories of goods and services. On the monetary side, reducing mandatory reserve rates 
which are high in most accession countries (in preparation for prospective euro area 
accession) will constitute a challenge for monetary policy;10 in particular in the currency 
board countries, where other monetary policy instruments are not available, such a move may 
lead to additional inflationary pressures.11 Furthermore, rising capital (in)flows in the context 
of the full liberalization of capital flows, a precondition for EU entry, will probably 
complicate monetary management and may well have an impact on inflation performance 
(depending on policy frameworks and responses to such flows).  
Conversely, EU accession will also have dampening effects on inflation. In particular, 
added competition in the Single Market and the effects resulting from the adoption of the EU 
tariff system have to mentioned in this context.12  
                                                 
9  Own calculations based on WIIW and Eurostat figures. Data for the other accession have not been available. 
10  Apart from the high mandatory reserve rates, most accession countries have brought their monetary 
instruments already largely in line with those of the euro area. An obvious exception to this are the currency 
board countries (which basically dispose of the mandatory reserve instrument only). 
11  One possible way to tackle this issue under a currency board arrangement would be the sale of central bank 
certificates of deposit in order to absorb the additional liquidity that is created through the reduction of 
mandatory reserve requirements.  
12  The inflation outlook for the first few years of the post-EU-accession period is further blurred by the 
uncertainties about the short-term impact of EU membership on aggregate demand developments in the 
accession countries and also about the room of maneuver of macroeconomic policies to deal with internal 
and external imbalances in this period. 
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3.2. Productivity Developments and Price Dynamics13 
The restructuring and catching-up process of the applicants is associated with inflation 
differentials between nontradables and tradables. Most of the analytical work on this issue so 
far has focused on supply-side effects and, more specifically, on the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. Under this effect, the price ratio (Pr) between nontradables (Pn) and tradables (Pt) 
develops, in formal terms, as follows (all variables are in logs)14: 
 nttnr aaPPP −=−= γ
δ  (1) 
where γ and δ  represent labor elasticities of production in the tradables and nontradables 
sectors, respectively, while at and an stand for the respective sectoral productivities. In other 
words, this effect results from differential productivity developments between tradables and 
nontradables, while wages are assumed to develop uniformly across sectors, with wage 
increases being driven by productivity increases in the tradables sector. Consequently, 
nontradables inflation is higher than tradables inflation, leading to a trend appreciation of the 
real exchange rate and to a convergence of comparative price levels. 
In order to investigate this issue in somewhat more detail, it is useful to start by taking a 
look at inflation and productivity growth differentials between tradables and nontradables in 
selected accession countries. Before doing so, three points have to be clarified. A first delicate 
issue which arises in this context is the definition of tradability. In the following analysis, 
manufacturing is taken as a rough but often used proxy for tradables. Secondly, the 
investigation is based on gross value added figures. The nominal values of these data series 
are used as weightings for the tradables and the nontradables sectors, and the implicit 
deflators of gross value added capture sectoral (tradables and nontradables) inflation. Further 
insights and evidence about the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect may be obtained 
from extending the examination by using gross output data. Thirdly, labor productivity 
developments are taken as a proxy for total factor productivity developments which are not 
on hand either. 
Inflation and productivity growth differentials between tradables and nontradables in four 
selected accession countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) are depicted in 
figure 2 and figure 3. In the course of the 1990s, the share of manufacturing in GDP ranged 
between one fifth and one third in these four countries. 
                                                 
13  This and the next section are based on joint work with Franz Schardax and Thomas Reininger (see also 
Fidrmuc and Schardax, 2000). 
14  For a derivation of this formula, see IMF (2000). 
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Figure 2   
Inflation Differential: Nontradables/Tradables, 1993-1998 
Note: Figure 2 is based on implicit sectoral deflators of gross value added. 
Figure 3   
Productivity Differentials Tradables/Nontradables, 1993-1998 
Note: Figure 3 is based on sectoral labor productivity growth figures. 
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How do these inflation differentials fit with the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis?  
Although the lack of appropriate data does not permit rigorous empirical tests of the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis for Central and Eastern European economies, the magnitude 
of relative price changes seems to be broadly in line with what the Balassa-Samuelson effect 
would predict.15 Figure 4, which is based on the approach chosen in IMF (2000), compares 
the predicted relative price ratio of tradables and nontradables which is implied by sectoral 
productivity developments according to equation (1) with actual outcomes. In general, 
predicted and observed price ratios move closely together. Except for Slovenia (until 1995) 
and the Czech Republic (until 1996), the outcomes are somewhat below predictions.16 
Figure 4   
Relative Prices: Nontradables/Tradables (Price Ratio), 1992=1 
Source: WIIW, own calculations.  
Note: Labor productivities were used instead of total productivities (for sectoral productivities). 
                                                 
15 However, as argued in more detail below, this strong correlation does not necessarily mean that the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is the only important force that determines inflation differentials between tradables and 
nontradables.  
16  This undershooting is in accordance with other studies that examined different country samples (see e.g. 
Canzoneri, Diba and Eudey, 1996). 
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The question of how the inflation differentials between nontradables and tradables affect 
overall inflation developments can be answered by weighing sectoral inflation rates (implicit 
deflators of gross value added) with their shares in total gross value added. This simple 
calculation yields the results displayed in Figure 5. 
Figure 5    
The contribution of tradables inflation and nontradables inflation to overall inflation 
(implicit deflators of gross value added) 
Note:  The upper lines show implicit overall annual deflators of gross value added between 1993 and 
1998. The contribution of tradables inflation and nontradables inflation to overall inflation is 
given in percentage points. 
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countries under review in the period 1993 to 1998. Typically, nontradables inflation 
accounted for about four fifths of overall inflation in this period. 
In order to gauge future sectoral inflation differentials between tradables and nontradables, 
it is important to understand the underlying forces that drive these changes. In the long run, 
these forces will primarily (if not exclusively) be supply-side effects. Apart from the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, these forces are not fully understood yet.  
The Balassa-Samuelson effect and the potential orders of magnitude it may take in the 
future requires a closer examination of several issues. First, to what extent does the basic 
assumption of the Balassa-Samuelson effect – wage growth equalization – hold in practice? 
One would have to examine sectoral wage and productivity data to address this question. 
Second, to what extent do the high productivity and inflation differentials of the past between 
tradables and nontradables reflect non-recurring factors rather than a long-term process? (Are 
the relatively low productivity differentials in 1998 a first sign of that one-time factors are 
petering out?) Third, the literature on conditional convergence (see e.g. Barro, 1991) suggests 
that productivity increases will tend to decelerate as differences in productivity levels narrow. 
How will this prediction affect productivity differentials in accession countries in the longer 
run? 
Apart from supply-side factors, demand-side factors may also be important for determining 
differentials between tradables and nontradables inflation in the short to medium run. (In fact, 
in the case of the catching-up economies of Central and Eastern Europe, deep structural 
change and substantial rises in income may set off a cascade of important demand changes, so 
that demand-side effects may prove to be rather persistent.) The relevance of demand-side 
factors is also supported by the rising share of nontradables in total output in a number of 
accession countries (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia in the period 1992 to 1998; not 
however Hungary, which has recorded a small increase in the share of tradables in GDP in the 
period), while the Balassa-Samuelson effect should produce falling shares of nontradables in 
total output.17 Rising shares of nontradables, in turn, may be due to the initially low share of 
services in aggregate supply and demand and to higher income elasticities for these goods (in 
particular for services) than for tradables. The resulting increase of demand for labor in that 
sector will spur wage growth in the nontradables sector. Normally, these pressures will 
contribute to elevating wage growth in this sector towards wage growth in the tradables 
sector, thus supporting wage growth equalization, as postulated by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. However, there may be periods of comparatively low productivity advances in the 
tradables sector coupled with high wage growth in the nontradables sector, which may then 
propel wage growth in the tradables sector beyond productivity improvements.18  
In the long run, accession countries will presumably experience far-reaching (but not 
necessarily fully complete) price level convergence with the EU/euro area. This is the flipside 
of the catching-up process and the trend real appreciation it entails. For the intermediate 
period, this implies either higher inflation rates or nominal appreciation. As argued above, it 
is very difficult to gauge future inflation differentials between tradables and nontradables. 
                                                 
17 Higher factor productivity in the tradable sector should induce labor and capital to move out of the 
nontradables sector, reducing the supply of nontradables and increasing the supply of tradables (IMF, 2000). 
18  Compare Cincibuch and Vavra (2000). 
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Past differentials are probably inadequate yardsticks, but it is still instructive to take a short 
look at the hypothetical implications of these past differentials.  
To this end, table 4 displays weighted inflation differentials between nontradable and 
tradable inflation in percentage points: The average inflation differential for the years 1992 to 
1998 is weighted by the share of nontradables in GDP. (The calculations are based on implicit 
sectoral deflators of gross value added.) 
Table 4  
Impact of Relative Price Changes on the Implicit Deflator of Total Gross Value Added 
(per year, average 1992 to 1998, percentage points) 
Inflation differentials  
between nontradables and tradables 
(weighted by the share of nontradables in the 
implicit deflator of total gross value added) 
Poland Slovenia Czech 
Republic 
Hungary
Inflation differentials observed 7.26 2.27 1.46 4.01 
Inflation differentials predicted  
by productivity differentials 
9.73 3.70 2.84 6.29 
Source: WIIW, OECD, own calculations.  
 
These differentials indicate the size of the overall annual inflation differential that would 
have prevailed between the accession countries and their main trading partners in the period 
1992 to 1998 as a consequence of nontradable/tradable inflation or productivity differentials, 
if two further conditions had been fulfilled, namely (1) uniform tradables inflation between 
accession countries and their main trading partners and (2) no productivity/inflation 
differentials between tradables and nontradables in the accession countries' main trading 
partners.19 
The former does not necessarily have to hold true, given the sizeable deviations between 
tradables prices of accession countries from international levels. The latter is a simplification, 
which largely holds true for the reference country (Germany) during the period under 
consideration,20 but is not fully correct for the broader European Union, where the Balassa-
Samuelson effect has had a certain upward impact on annual inflation.21 If taken into account, 
this would reduce the sectoral inflation differentials displayed in table 4 correspondingly.  
If the exchange rates had been nominally stable in the period under consideration, these 
inflation differentials would have been equal to the size of annual convergence of 
comparative price levels between the accession countries and their main trading partners. 
                                                 
19  As regards the latter, it should be mentioned that relative price changes and productivity growth differentials 
of nontradables/tradables were small in Germany in the period 1992 to 1998. 
20  Relative price changes and productivity growth differentials of nontradables/tradables were small in 
Germany in the period 1992 to 1998. 
21  According to IMF (2000), a rough (annual) estimate of the Balassa-Samuelson effect for the "core European 
countries" is around 0.8 percentage points. 
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Alternatively, these measures can also be taken to indicate the magnitude of the annual 
nominal appreciation of the exchange rate that the accession countries would have had to 
accomplish to achieve an inflation rate as low as that prevailing in their main trading partner 
countries. To be precise, a further condition must be fulfilled for this to hold true, namely 
swift and full adjustment of tradables prices and wages to that nominal appreciation 
(implying a possible need for downward nominal flexibility). In particular, this condition 
implies that the productivity differential between tradables and nontradables must not 
increase in reaction to that nominal appreciation.22  
Such a magnitude of annual nominal appreciation combined with an inflation rate as low as 
that prevailing in the main trading partner countries would have rendered the same size of 
annual convergence of comparative price levels in the period under consideration as under the 
fixed exchange rate scenario discussed above. 
To round this discussion off, it should be stressed again that it is an open question to what 
extent the presented figures, which are derived from past developments, are predictive of 
future developments. 
Except for the case of Poland, the results reported in table 4 are broadly similar with those 
of other studies that aim at quantifying the Balassa-Samuelson effect.23 Table 4 seems to 
indicate that productivity-predicted inflation differentials tend to exceed observed 
differentials, which is not an unusual result.24 The IMF’s investigation (IMF, 2000) of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect in Slovenia, which uses a very similar methodology but different 
data, arrives at somewhat lower estimates for productivity-implied inflation differences 
between Slovenia and the EU (1.5 to 2 percentage points).25 The results of Simon and Kovacs 
(1998) for Hungary are based on a slightly different classification of sectors. Presenting 
results for different assumptions about developments in agriculture, their main scenario 
assumes a sectoral productivity-induced appreciation of the real exchange rate (based on the 
GDP deflator) of 2.9% per year. Pelkmans, Gros and Ferrer (2000), who use relative price 
level data and do not investigate the relationship between sectoral productivity developments 
and inflation directly, estimate an average inflation differential of 3.8% between the ten 
applicant countries and the euro zone. 
                                                 
22  Otherwise, if price and/or wages do not adjust fully, the magnitude of the nominal appreciation would need 
to be higher. In particular, if tradable prices adjust, but the adjustment of wages in the tradables sector is 
incomplete, the productivity differential between tradables and nontradables would probably increase and the 
size of nominal appreciation would have to be higher to achieve an inflation rate as low as that prevailing in 
the main trade partner countries. 
23  In the case of Poland, alternative calculations based on implicit sectoral deflators of gross output (instead of 
gross value added) render results which are more in line with those for the other countries, putting the 
observed sectoral inflation differential at 4.19% p.a. and the sectoral inflation differential predicted by the 
productivity differential at 5.30% p.a. in the period 1992 to 1998. 
24  See for example Canzoneri, Diba and Eudey (1996). 
25  This result is based on an estimated annual magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect on the order of 2.6 
percentage points in Slovenia minus the the size of the same effect in "core European countries" indicated 
above.  
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3.3. Wage Developments in the Tradables Sector 
Another source of inflation may arise from wage developments in the tradables sector. There 
will be an inflationary bias if wage-setting mechanisms do not work well. If wage increases in 
the tradables sector tend to systematically exceed productivity increases, they may be 
accommodated by a reduction in profit margins for a certain time. However, eventually such 
a development will have to lead to higher prices of tradables. If prices of tradables are already 
uniform across countries (i.e. conform to the “law of one price”), a nominal depreciation of 
the domestic currency will be needed to maintain the competitive position.26 However, such a 
depreciation will not cure the underlying imperfections in wage-setting by itself. Moreover, it 
will have broader implications if it sets in motion a wage-price spiral in the respective 
economy. 
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to examine the wage-setting mechanisms that are in 
place in the accession countries and to assess their future operation. An alternative way of 
exploring this issue further is to look unit labor cost (ULC) developments and to relate them 
to the development of the real exchange rate (deflated by the prices of tradables). Such an 
exercise, done for the period 1992 to 1998, yields the following results. 
Cost factors may have contributed to real appreciation in the Czech Republic and to some 
extent in Slovenia, because these countries experienced a rise in exchange rate-corrected unit 
labor costs in the period under review (see table 5). In contrast to Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia not only recorded a rise in unit labor costs (expressed in Deutsche mark), but at 
the same time an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This seems to indicate that producers 
in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia were more successful in passing on rising wage costs 
to customers than their counterparts in Poland. The extent of real appreciation in the tradables 
sector in the Czech Republic can probably be explained in part by the very low level of the 
real exchange rate in 1992. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that profitability in the 
tradables sectors must have declined not only in Poland but also in the Czech Republic in the 
period under observation, as the rise in real unit labor costs exceeded the change in the real 
exchange rate. Although one should be aware of the importance of the choice of the base 
year, the development of wages in the Czech Republic and in Poland between 1992 and 1998 
thus negatively affected the tradables sectors of the two economies. A continuation of these 
developments into the future would increase upward pressures on tradables prices and may 
ultimately lead to a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. Unlike in Poland and the 
Czech Republic, wage developments did not cause a decline in competitiveness in Slovenia 
and Hungary, as the rise in unit labor cost in Deutsche mark terms was smaller than real 
appreciation in terms of tradables prices in Slovenia, and Hungary recorded a ULC decline 
which was more pronounced than real depreciation.  
                                                 
26  It should be noted that tradables prices of Central and Eastern European countries actually are often 
considerably below international levels. It is difficult to assess whether the observed deviations in tradables 
prices really constitute empirical evidence against the "law of one price." Part of the price gaps may be due 
to differences in quality which statisticians have been unable to capture.  
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Table 5  
Unit Labor Cost in the Tradables Sector and Real Appreciation 
(from 1992 to 1998, cumulated) 
 
 Poland27 Slovenia Czech 
Republic 
Hungary
 
Unit labor cost, DEM 
 
 
8.4% 
 
6.4% 
 
84.1% 
 
-28.3% 
Real exchange rate against the DEM 
(based on the implicit deflator for gross value 
added of the tradables sector) 
 
-7.4% 
 
15.8% 
 
65.7% 
 
-9.5% 
Source: WIIW, own calculations.   
 
What does this imply? Obviously, one cannot conclude that wage developments of the past 
– whether they were in line with productivity developments or not – will show a steady 
pattern in the future. Therefore, historical patterns may be poor guides for judging prospective 
developments. Nevertheless, this analysis is still interesting because it provides some 
information about how far wage setting in the tradables sector will have to be adjusted to 
shake off any potential inflationary bias in the future. 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS28 
4.1. The Overall Policy Mix  
Economic policymakers in the accession countries face the challenge of reducing inflation at 
the lowest possible cost (in terms of lower real growth), while avoiding excessive current 
account imbalances and financial instability (and, in particular, sudden reversals of capital 
flows). In this perspective, with a view to preserving external competitiveness, it is more 
important to achieve disinflation in tradables than in nontradables. 
In view of the manifold potential sources of inflation, it becomes very clear that responses 
are needed in a number of policy fields, not least to achieve fully adequate policy reactions to 
particular factors driving inflation. Moreover, a balanced approach that relies on measures in 
several policy fields helps to avoid the excessive use of a particular instrument, with 
potentially decreasing marginal rates of return or growing negative side effects.  
                                                 
27  In the case of Poland, alternative calculations based on the implicit deflator of gross output (instead of gross 
value added) in the tradables sector render somewhat different results, with an increase of ULC in Deutsche 
mark by 9.3% and an appreciation (instead of depreciation) of the real exchange rate against the Deutsche 
mark by 8.5%. 
28 This section is mostly based on joint work with Thomas Reininger. 
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The concrete design of the overall policy mix is case- and time-dependent. Nevertheless, 
one can make a few general observations  that pertain to most or all Central and Eastern 
European accession countries at the current stage. 
In the area of fiscal policy, a careful handling of changes in indirect taxes and charges 
seems to be important. Moreover, a prudent conduct of fiscal policy will support the 
avoidance of excessive aggregate domestic demand and thus external imbalances and/or 
(additional) inflationary pressures, hence leaving monetary policy more room to maneuver. 
In countries which have experienced wage inflation, the question arises whether incomes 
policies can and should play a role in containing wage growth in line with productivity 
developments. This also poses the question of institution building, for instance, the 
development of a (better) functioning tripartite mechanism. 
In the realm of structural policy, ambitious efforts to speed up restructuring and 
privatization in sectors whose product prices are (partly) still administered could turn out to 
be an important contribution to disinflation. The resulting boost in productivity could dampen 
the size of the necessary adjustments of administered prices. Moreover, this would facilitate 
earlier full liberalization of these sectors, including an unlimited opening to imports, which 
should further support the disinflation trend. Finally, decisive measures in these sectors and 
the phasing out of administered prices would probably dampen expectations of future 
inflation. 
In the field of agricultural policy, a timely and comprehensive substitution of shortfalls in 
domestic production by imports in the case of adverse weather conditions (perhaps combined 
with schemes of direct income compensation payments to farmers) may contribute to limiting 
the associated inflationary pressures. In a medium-term perspective, there is a need, in a 
number of accession countries, to design and pursue a reliable and transparent policy of 
restructuring the agricultural sector and of developing rural regions, not least in order to 
clamp down on calls for price policy measures whenever adverse weather conditions affect 
crops.  
The speed of disinflation and of prospective adjustment paths to future inflationary shocks 
are, to a great extent, conditioned and predetermined by the design and the consistency of the 
overall policy mix.  
4.2. The Role of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
The main task of the accession countries' central banks is to contribute to the process of  
disinflation while maintaining a reasonable degree of external balance. A key precondition for 
successful disinflation is to reduce inflation expectations and anchor them at low levels. 
In practice, most Central and Eastern European accession countries are currently following 
two alternative basic monetary strategies to achieve these goals, namely either exchange rate-
based strategies or direct inflation targeting strategies. Monetary targeting, in turn, is the 
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policy of choice only for Slovenia (which, however, at the same time places considerable de 
facto weight on exchange rate developments). 
The selection of the most appropriate strategy is both country-specific and time-dependent. 
There is no single strategy that is a priori optimal for all countries at all times. Moreover, one 
has to distinguish between the pros and cons per se of a certain monetary policy strategy and 
the potential costs involved in a regime change. The potential credibility losses of a switch in 
regimes and the resulting repercussions in the financial markets have to be assessed carefully. 
Any regime shift certainly needs a very active communication policy. 
The basic advantages and disadvantages of both principal strategies are well known and do 
not have to be recapitulated here at length. In a nutshell, a fixed exchange rate regime is 
conducive to cross-border trade and investment, but it carries the risk of exchange rate 
misalignments, which may be difficult and costly to correct without nominal exchange rate 
changes. Furthermore, such a regime tends to be more exposed to major and sometimes 
sudden swings in capital flows that are unrelated to changes in fundamentals. Direct inflation 
targeting in accession countries, in turn, is fraught with the difficulty of forecasting inflation, 
and a lack of knowledge about the relationship between the instruments and the target. 
Moreover, it carries the risk of large exchange rate swings and exchange rate overshooting 
(due to potentially sizeable capital inflows).  
Monetary policymaking in accession countries is made even more challenging by the 
uneven functioning of monetary transmission channels.29 Two recent empirical studies find 
that central bank stabilization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe still have to rely mainly 
on the exchange rate channel, while the interest rate channel is not well developed yet. 
Certainly, the situation differs from country to country, depending, for instance, on the level 
of domestic credit relative to GDP. In any case, it follows that one important task for 
monetary policy consists in strengthening the interest rate channel via structural reforms 
within the financial sector and measures to deepen domestic fixed-income markets. The 
growing share of foreign strategic interests in the domestic banking sector may change the 
functioning of the interest rate channel relatively quickly. As the Central and Eastern 
European accession countries are generally small and open economies and do not yet have 
fully functioning interest rate channels for transmission, the exchange rate still has a major 
impact on inflation performance in these countries, irrespective of the monetary strategy 
chosen. 
From the preceding analysis of price dynamics in accession countries, two major points 
emerge that have a direct bearing on the prospective monetary policy courses of accession 
countries.  
First, as long as there is tangible inertial inflation (in particular wage inflation in the 
tradables sector) or if other – mainly transition-related – cost-push factors create inflationary 
pressures or if the fiscal position is not consolidated, it may be risky to move on to a rigid 
                                                 
29  See e.g. Christofferson and Wescott (1999) or Fidrmuc and Schardax (1999). For a different view, see 
Orlowski (2000), who argues that monetary transmission tends to be a function of the monetary policy 
strategy adopted. Compare also Rybinski (2000), who finds that the interest channel works in Poland but 
with long lags. 
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(nonadjustable) fixed peg. In such a situation, some downward nominal exchange rate 
flexibility may still be needed to preserve price competitiveness. Under these conditions, a 
case for a fixed peg could only be made,  if such a regime change altered wage formation and 
enhanced fiscal prudence. However, such changes cannot be taken for granted, and even if 
they do occur, the change in behavior may not be sufficient to make a fully fixed rate 
sustainable in the longer run.  In a similar vein, any monetary strategy that would allow for 
nominal appreciation in an inflationary environment likewise carries major risks.  
Second, if and when the inflation bias resulting from transition and imperfect wage 
formation is basically overcome and price dynamics are mainly driven by catching up-related 
factors, in particular differential productivity developments, the transition countries have (in 
pure conceptual terms) two basic options: either a nominal-appreciation/low-inflation strategy 
or, alternatively, a strategy of maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate with somewhat 
higher inflation. It should be noted that both of these strategies can be followed under 
different exchange rate regimes. While the nominal appreciation strategy can be implemented 
both in a flexible exchange rate context (in the case of the Central and Eastern European 
accession countries, typically under direct inflation targeting) and under a tighter exchange 
rate regime (e.g. a tightly managed float or a fixed but adjustable peg), a stable nominal 
exchange rate can be achieved both under a fixed regime or under a managed float. 
Whether a nominal-appreciation/low-inflation strategy or a stable nominal exchange rate 
with somewhat higher inflation is the more appropriate option, depends on a whole range of 
issues, like a possible unsettling of expectations as a consequence of nominal appreciation 
(e.g. if this would imply a major exchange rate regime shift), the potential for exchange rate 
overshooting or the existence of price and/or wage rigidities in the tradables sector. 
Moreover, even if such rigidities do not exist, the more restrictive monetary policy stance to 
move to nominal appreciation/low inflation may (at least) temporarily affect real growth. 
From an integration viewpoint,30 both strategies seem to be equally viable for EU 
accession. The same appears to be true for subsequent participation in the ERM II. Joining the 
exchange rate mechanism can take place from any preceding monetary and exchange rate 
regime, while participating in ERM II presupposes a fixed (but adjustable) peg to the euro or 
a tightly managed float with the euro as the reference currency.  
To eventually join the euro area, inflation has to be reduced to low levels in the year that is 
relevant for the convergence examination. Whether the Maastricht convergence criterion on 
inflation would, as it is sometimes claimed, unduly constrain growth dynamics in a catching-
up economy that intends to qualify for participation in the euro area without being willing to 
allow a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate remains to be seen. From today’s 
perspective, it is just too early to assess with any degree of certainty how dynamic the 
catching-up process will be in the accession countries then and to what extent differential 
productivity advances will drive price developments in the euro area. Furthermore, it has to 
be seen that actual inflation oscillates around the medium-term trend implied by the Balassa-
                                                 
30  The European Union, including the Eurosystem, has outlined a three-step approach to the monetary 
integration of candidate countries. The applicants will first join the EU, then enter the exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM II) of the European Union and finally, after fulfillment of the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, accede to the euro area, i.e. participate fully in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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Samuelson effect and that overall inflation performance also hinges upon a number of other 
factors and developments which can hardly be anticipated either from today's viewpoint. 
Will differential productivity developments complicate monetary policymaking in a future 
enlarged euro area? The relative economic weight of the accession countries is tiny and 
clearly smaller than the weight of the Southern European catching-up economies in today's 
euro area.31 Even if all accession countries accede to the EU in the medium run and if they 
join the euro area a few years after their accession to the EU and if all of them catch up 
quickly, this would not make the meeting of the Eurosystem's price stability objective 
tangibly more difficult, as euro area-wide inflation would only rise very slightly on account of 
the working of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the new euro area participants.32 Moreover, 
the Southern European catching-up economies of today's euro area should have largely 
matured by the time when the first Central and Eastern European countries accede to this 
single currency area. While the economies of today's euro area will have become more 
homogeneous by that time, the inclusion of the frontrunners among the Central and Eastern 
European countries into the euro area will presumably not make it significantly more 
heterogeneous than it is today. Even in the very long run, when the per-capita GDP of the 
Central and Eastern European countries approaches the EU average, difficulties for monetary 
policymaking will presumably be contained, as most of these economies will, at that stage, 
grow at a much more moderate pace than during the earlier stages of the catching-up. 
While gaps in the levels of economic development may have a certain relevance for 
monetary policymaking, other factors seem to be more important for the functioning and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy after accession countries will have joined the euro area. 
These factors can mainly be related to the issue of convergence of economic structures. They 
include differences or similarities in the monetary transmission mechanism, in money 
demand and in the structure of the financial sector as well as the degree of integration of 
financial markets. 
 
                                                 
31  In 1999, the nominal GDP in USD at current exchange rates of all accession countries was at 6% of the 
nominal GDP in USD of the Euro area (including Greece). In comparison, the combined nominal GDP of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain amounted to 12% of the Euro area (including Greece). 
32  Furthermore, the higher potential growth path of the accession countries will be taken into account when 
establishing the weighted average growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3 for the whole euro area as 
reference value for monetary policy decisions. 
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